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The paper extends a theoratical framework to analyze the impact of R&D spillovers on entry and the 
resulting equilibrium market structure. It is shown that the degree of spillovers plays a fundamental role on 
the number of firms entering the market, their R&D activities, and social welfare. The analysis suggests that 
social welfare is maximized at some intermediate degree of spillovers. The policy implication of this result is 
that neither complete protection of intellectual property right nor lax enforcement of patent laws is socially 
optimal. 
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1 Introduction 
In the economic literature, innovation – also called R&D – is often classified as product 
innovation or process innovation. A firm carries out a program of product innovation to find a 
new product that it hopes will generate new demand and lead to large profits. Process innovation, 
on the other hand, aims at finding a new process to reduce the production cost of a product. A 
lower production cost, which is the desired outcome of the R&D program, gives the firm a cost 
advantage over its rivals. Whether a program of innovation will be carried out or not depends on 
the cost of R&D and the market structure in which the firm finds itself. Knowledge and benefits 
obtained by a firm from its R&D activities typically leak out to other firms, to consumers and, 
eventually, to other countries. These leakages – called R&D spillovers – mean that a firm cannot 
appropriate all the fruit of its R&D activities, especially when spillovers flow to its competitors 
in the same industry. However, from society’s point of view, spillovers represent positive 
externalities in the sense that they reduce the production costs of other firms, with the ensuing 
consequence of lower prices for consumers. In a review of the literature on R&D aimed at 
providing guidelines for recent efforts to include R&D in the national income accounts, 
Sveikauskas (2007) indicated that perhaps the private rate of return to R&D is 25%, while it is 
65% for social returns.   
 
In light of the positive externalities generated by R&D activities, the authorities charged with 
competition policy in Europe and Japan have adopted a rather permissive anti-trust attitude 
toward R&D cooperation for quite some time. The research – both theoretical and empirical – 
received the needed impetus in 1984 when the US passed the National Cooperation Act in 1984, 
allowing firms to cooperate in R&D, but not in product markets. Over the last two decades, the 
economics of R&D spillovers has been one of the most active fields of research in industrial 
economics.  
The theoretical literature on competition and cooperation in R&D with technological spillovers 
can be said to begin with the pioneering work of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) (AJ 
hereafter), who formulated a two-stage duopoly game of R&D spillovers in which the two firms 
behave in a non-cooperative manner in the second (production) stage, but can either cooperate or 
behave in a non-cooperative manner in the first (R&D) stage. Now when the two firms behave 
cooperatively in the R&D stage, it is reasonable to expect that the cooperation will lead to a 
lower level of total R&D expenditures made by the two firms because of less wasteful 
duplications and a lower level of total output resulted from the monopoly power. AJ 
demonstrated that these expectations are far from being fulfilled in a simple two-stage linear-
quadratic game – linear demand curve, linear total cost, and quadratic R&D costs. Three 
different scenarios of competition are considered by AJ. Under the first scenario, the two firms 
act non-cooperatively in both stages of the game. Under the second scenario, the two firms 
cooperate in the first stage, but behave non-cooperatively in the second stage. Under the third 
scenario, the two firms behave jointly like a single integrated firm in both stages of the game. AJ 
also considered the problem faced by the central planner. The linear-quadratic structure of the 
model makes it possible to obtain a closed-form solution for each of the problems and allows for 
a comparison of the solutions – R&D expenditures and welfare – of the four models. In the 
analysis carried out by AJ, the degree of R&D spillovers plays a critical role. AJ showed that 
when the degree of R&D spillovers is high, the level of R&D expenditures and total output are 
higher under the second scenario than under the first scenario. Otherwise, the opposite results 
hold. For a high degree of R&D spillovers, the R&D expenditures under the social optimum are 
highest to be followed – in descending order – successively by the R&D expenditures under the 
scenario that the two firms act like a single integrated firm, the scenario that the two firms 
cooperate in R&D, but act non-cooperatively in the production stage, and the scenario that the 
two firms behave non-cooperatively in both stages of the game.    
The results on the comparative performance of non-cooperative and cooperative R&D derived by 
AJ have received – in the duopoly context – a thorough generalization by Amir et al. (2003). In 
particular, when the two firms cooperate in R&D, these researchers allowed the firms to 
determine jointly their R&D expenditures and the degree of R&D spillovers. The R&D degree of 
spillovers is thus endogenous, and can be chosen to maximize joint profits net of R&D costs.            
The AJ model was extended by Suzumura (1992) to the case of many firms, general demand, and 
general cost conditions. The more general model of Suzumura precludes the possibility of 
computing the equilibria of the two-stage games for various specifications of R&D, and it is no 
longer possible to compare these equilibria directly. This researcher resolved this difficulty by 
trying to answer the question of starting from an equilibrium – under non-cooperative R&D or 
cooperative R&D – can social welfare be raised by marginally increasing R&D expenditures? 
Two measures of social welfare are used in these exercises: the first-best social optimum and the 
second-best social optimum. According to the first-best measure of social welfare, the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus is maximized, and the marginal cost pricing rule, which 
underlines the first-best solution, can be enforced by the authorities. According to the second-
best measure of social welfare, the firms are allowed to compete according to the Cournot model 
of competition. Suzumura demonstrated that when the degree of spillovers is high, starting from 
the equilibrium level of R&D expenditures under the scenario that the firms act non-
cooperatively in both stages of the game, first-best social welfare can be raised by marginally 
increasing R&D expenditures. The opposite result holds if there are no spillovers. As for the 
equilibrium under cooperative R&D, first-best social welfare can be raised by marginally 
increasing R&D expenditures, whether the degree of spillovers is high or low. If one uses the 
second-best measure of social welfare, then starting from the equilibrium level of R&D 
expenditures under the scenario that the firms act non-cooperatively in both stages of the game, 
social welfare can be raised by marginally increasing R&D expenditures if the degree of 
spillovers is high. The opposite result holds if there are no R&D spillovers and if the number of 
firms is sufficiently large. As for the case of cooperative R&D, social welfare can be raised by 
marginally increasing R&D expenditures, whether the degree of spillovers is high or low.  
The welfare results of Suzumura are obtained under two extreme assumptions – high and low 
degrees of spillovers. Yi (1996) completed the analysis of Suzumura by considering the 
intermediate case of neither high nor low degrees of spillovers. More specifically, Yi established 
the following results. First, cooperative R&D lowers both R&D expenditures and social welfare 
for intermediate degrees of spillovers. Second, cooperative R&D lowers R&D expenditures, but 
has an ambiguous effect on social welfare for low degrees of spillovers. Third, as the elasticity of 
the slope of the inverse market demand curve rises, cooperative R&D raises social welfare for a 
larger set of degrees of spillovers, and in the limit, is socially beneficial for all degrees of 
spillovers.  
The AJ’s model has also been extended by other researchers, such as Kamien et al. (1992), 
Kamien and Zang (1993), Poyago-Theotoky (1996), and Atallah (2000) to study the issue of 
R&D cartelization and research joint ventures. In the models formulated by theses authors a 
subset of the firms in the industry might get together and form a Research Joint Venture. A 
survey of the main results of the literature on spillovers and innovative activities is provided by 
De Bondt (1996). The predictions of the AJ model, especially the important question of whether 
spillovers increase firms' incentives to cooperate in R&D, has been addressed by a number of 
empirical studies with mixed results; see, for example, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and 
Sustens (2004). 
 
In the literature on R&D spillovers and process innovation, efforts are mostly focused on the 
comparative R&D expenditures and the relative social welfare between non-cooperative and 
cooperative R&D. The question of how innovation is affected when there is more competition, 
i.e., when the number of firms rises, is ignored by most researchers, except for De Bondt et al. 
(1992), who discussed how the number of firms affects innovation. However, the question of 
how R&D spillovers affect entry was not addressed by these researchers. In this paper, we 
attempt to fill part of this lacuna by endogenizing the number of firms. More specifically, our 
model addresses the following questions. First, how does the degree of spillovers affect the 
equilibrium number of firms? Second, how does the degree of spillovers affect the equilibrium 
market structure? Third, when is the equilibrium symmetric and when is it not symmetric, and in 
the case of asymmetric equilibria, how many firms choose to incur a positive amount of own 
R&D cost and how many firms choose to free ride on the R&D activities of others?2  
 
The model we formulate to analyze the influence of R&D spillovers on entry is a two-stage game 
played by a number of firms producing a homogeneous good. In the first stage of the game, the 
firms carry out R&D activities to lower their production cost. It is assumed that before 
innovation, all the firms have the same marginal cost. In the second stage, the firms compete in 
the product market according to the Cournot model of competition. All the firms act non-
cooperatively in both stages of the game. In the R&D stage, each firm runs its own research lab, 
and takes into account the natural spillovers that flow among firms in a strategic manner. In 
modeling the horizontal spillovers among firms, we follow the pioneering work of Ruff (1969), 
who analyzed a stylized growth model in which firms compete according to the Cournot model 
                                                 
2See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Atallah (2007), Vives (2008), and Erkal and Piccinin (2010) for more 
information. 
of competition, and in which firms undertake R&D activities by employing research workers. In 
Ruff’s model, a firm recognizes a potential transmission of knowledge from other firms, and the 
transmission of knowledge is modeled by assuming that the effective input in R&D of a firm 
consists of its own input plus part of the inputs of all the other firms. Ruff’s analytical treatment 
of R&D spillovers has been adopted by later researchers, such as Spence (1984), Kamien et al. 
(1992), and Amir et al. (2003). On the other hand, in the AJ-type models, the R&D process is 
represented by a cost function, which gives the R&D cost (the dependent variable) as a quadratic 
function of the desired level of cost reduction (the independent variable). In these models, a firm 
chooses its own level of cost reduction, and the spillovers take the form of R&D output 
spillovers in the sense that the effective cost reduction of a firm is the firm’s own chosen cost 
reduction plus a fraction of the cost reductions chosen by all the other firms. At first sight, one 
might think that the two ways of modeling R&D spillovers are equivalent, and should yield the 
same results. However, this presumption is not correct because for some questions the results 
obtained by the two approaches diverge. For example, Amir et al. (2003) found that a firm’s 
effective R&D expenditure is a strictly decreasing function of the degree of spillovers while De 
Bondt et al. (1992) found an inverted-U relationship between the degree of spillovers and the 
effective cost reduction of each firm.  
 
Our findings can be described as follows. If the degree of spillovers is low, only a finite number 
of firms enter the market, and after entry – all the firms expend the same amount of their own 
resources on R&D. We refer to this type of equilibrium as a symmetric equilibrium with 
innovation. The intuition behind this result is not hard to understand. When the degree of 
spillovers is low, a firm cannot rely on the R&D externalities generated by the other firms to 
lower its own marginal cost. If the degree of spillovers is high, an infinite number of firms enter 
the market, and after entry none of the firms chooses to expend any of its own resource on R&D. 
The equilibrium is a perfectly competitive equilibrium without innovation. For intermediate 
values of the degree of spillovers, the equilibrium is an asymmetric equilibrium under which 
some firms choose to expend their own resources on R&D, while others choose not to do so. 
Furthermore, all the firms that choose to expend their own resources on R&D choose the same 
amount of own expenditure on R&D. In the literature on R&D spillovers and innovation, the 
number of firms in the market is taken as exogenous, and the equilibrium is presumed to be 
symmetric. In our model, the number of firms that enter the market is endogenous, and varies 
according to the degree of spillovers. The endogenization of the number of firms yields different 
types of equilibrium market structures – symmetric equilibrium with innovation, asymmetric 
equilibrium with innovation, and perfect competition without innovation – and these are novel 
results in the field of R&D spillovers and innovation.  
Our welfare analysis suggests that social welfare rises with the degree of spillovers when it is 
low, reaches a maximum when the degree of spillovers enters its intermediate range, and then 
declines to the level associated with the competitive equilibrium without innovation. The policy 
implication of this result is that the intellectual property right should not be fully protected and 
the enforcement of patent laws should not be too lax. The optimal degree of protection should 
reflect the right trade-off between allocative and dynamic efficiency.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the general features of the model are presented. 
In Section 3, the post-innovation equilibrium is discussed. The equilibrium in the innovation 
stage is analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5, entry is discussed. Section 6 presents the main 
properties of the equilibrium. In Section 7, a numerical simulation of the model is presented. The 
simulation illustrates the main properties of the model. Some concluding remarks are given in 
Section 8. The annex contains some technical arguments used to support the theoretical 
arguments in Section 6.  
 
2 The general features of the model 
Consider the market for a homogenous commodity in which there are  symmetric firms. These 
firms play a two-stage game, which can be described as follows. In the first stage, each firm 
carries out an R&D program to reduce its production cost. In the second stage, the firms – with 
lower marginal costs brought about by the process innovation programs carried out in the first 
stage – compete in the product market. Let  
(1) bQap −=   
be the inverse market demand curve for the product, where Q  is the industry output, and p  is 
the market price. Also, a  and b  are two positive parameters.  
We assume that in both stages of the game the firms act non-cooperatively and that in the second 
stage they compete according to the Cournot model of competition. In the first stage, and before 
the process innovation, the firms are symmetric in the sense that all the firms start with the same 
initial marginal cost, say .0 , 00 acc <<  To model the R&D process, we follow Ruff (1969), and 
suppose that research workers constitute the only input in a program of process innovation. 
Furthermore, assuming that the wage received by a worker is the numéraire, we can identify the 
number of research workers with the R&D expenditure. We shall let ][Xf  denote the reduction 
in marginal cost yielded by a program of process innovation when X is the firms effective R&D 
expenditure, with the effective R&D expenditure being the sum of the firm’s own R&D 
expenditure plus the spillovers from the other innovation programs. The R&D production 
function is assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. 
Furthermore, ,]0['0 ,0]0[ ∞<<= ff  and 	 ≤ . The condition 	 ≤  ensures 
that the cost reduction is strictly less than , regardless of the level of effective R&D input. 
Also, we shall assume that 0	 is not too low to discourage a firm, when it is the only firm in 
the market, from investing in R&D to reduce its marginal cost. Note that the Inada condition 
0][' =
∞→ XfimXl  follows from the concavity and the boundedness of the R&D production 
function. An R&D technology that satisfies these assumptions is 
(2) 	 = 1 − , 
 
where  > 0 is a parameter that characterizes the productivity of the R&D technology.3 
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 In the AJ model, the R&D cost needed to achieve a level of marginal cost reduction is assumed to be a quadratic 
function of the R&D output. The production function that corresponds to such a cost function has the functional 
form 	 = 2, where  > 0 is a parameter that characterizes the productivity of the R&D process, with a lower 
value of  representing a more productive technology.  Although it makes the computation of an equilibrium simple, 
the R&D technology of the AJ model has some undesirable features. First, when the effective R&D expenditure is 
large, the reduction in marginal cost will exceed the initial marginal cost, rendering the post-innovation marginal 
cost negative, and this is absurd. Second, given that the initial marginal cost was the outcome of past R&D activities 
and given the presumed diminishing returns involved in R&D activities, the reduction in marginal cost yielded by 
new R&D activities must necessarily be bounded at the margin. That is, the Inada condition ℓ→	 = ∞ 
The cost reduction obtained by firm i  is assumed to be given by ],[ ∑ ≠+ ij ji xxf β  where 
,10 ≤≤ β  is a parameter that represents the degree of spillovers from the R&D activities of all 
the other firms, and ,,...,1, njx j =  is firm sj'  own R&D expenditure. The expression ∑ ≠ij jxβ  
represents the spillovers to firm i  from the R&D activities of all the other firms. The sum 
∑ ≠+= ij jii xxX β  thus represents the effective R&D expenditure of firm i  in its own program 
of process innovation. When ,0=β  there are no spillovers, and when ,1=β  there are full 
spillovers. The intermediate case 10 << β  corresponds to the situation of partial spillovers. 
  
3 The post-innovation equilibrium 
When each firm carries out its own process innovation program, the reduction in the marginal 
cost of a firm, say firm ,i  is ],[ ∑ ≠+ ij ji xxf β  and its post-innovation marginal cost is given by 
(3) ].[01 ∑ ≠+−= ij jii xxfcc β   
Let iq  be the output of firm .i  The profit obtained by firm  in the production stage and under 
the strategy profile "#, … , "% , … , "& is 
'%"#, … , "% , … , "&	 = "%( − )"# +⋯+ "% +⋯+ "& − %#.  
In the production stage, firm  solves the following profit maximization problem: 
(4) (,-.'%"#, … , "% , … , "&	.                                = 1,… , .                 
If the post-innovation cost of firm  is high, it will not be able to compete with the other firms 
and will choose not to produce, with the ensuing consequence that it makes zero profit in the 
production stage. On the other hand, if its post-innovation marginal cost is not too high, firm  
                                                                                                                                                             
exhibited by the R&D technology in the AJ model is difficult to defend. Finally, the quadratic R&D cost function 
yields a reduction in marginal cost that is proportional to the difference between the choke price and the initial 
marginal cost (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), page 1114). This result means that the higher is the initial 
marginal cost, the lower will be the marginal cost reduction. In particular, when the initial marginal cost is so high to 
be equal to the choke price, the marginal cost reduction will be zero, a result that is clearly unsatisfactory.         
will be able to produce a positive level of output and earn positive profits in the production stage. 
Thus, the first-order condition that characterizes the best response of firm  to /"0102% is 
(5) ( − )"# +⋯+ "% +⋯+ "& − %# − )"% ≤ 0,                  = 1,… , , 
with equality holding if "% > 0. The first-order condition (5) is also sufficient because '%"#, … , "% , … , "&	 is strictly concave in "% . 
The  first-order conditions (5) can be used to compute the equilibrium output of each firm, as a 
function of its post-innovation marginal cost. If we let "%##, … , &#	 denote the equilibrium 
output of firm  in the production stage, then the profit it earns in this stage is given by 
(6) 3%##, … , &#	 = '%"###, … , &#	, … , "%##, … , &#	, … , "&##, … , &#		. 
Note that  3%##, … , &#	 ≥ 0, with strict inequality holding if %# is not too high. 
Let 5 denote the subset of firms that produce a positive level of output and a fortiori earns a 
positive level of profit in the production stage. For each  ∈ 5, the first-order condition (5) holds 
with equality, and summing these first-order conditions over  ∈ 5, we obtain 
 (7) |5|( − |5|)8 − ∑ %#%∈: − )8 ≤ 0, 
 
where 8 = "# +⋯+ "% +⋯+ "& denotes the industry output, and |5| denotes the number of 
elements in 5, ie., the number of firms that produce a positive level of output. 
It follows from (7) that 
(8) 8 = |:|;∑ <.=.∈>|:|?#@ .   
Using (8), we obtain the following expression for the equilibrium market price 
(9)  = ( − )8 = ;?∑ <.=.∈>|:|?# . 
 
Using (8) in (5), we obtain the following expression for the output of a firm, say , which 
produces a positive level of output in the production stage: 
(10) "% = ;|:|<.=?∑ <A=A∈>,AB.|:|?#@ ,                                                                                                  ∈ 5. 
 
The profit made by firm i  in the post-innovation stage is then given by 
(11) 3%##, … , &#	 = "% − %# 
   = CD;|:|<.=?∑ <A=A∈>,AB. EF|:|?#F@ , 	 ∈ 5H, HIℎKL. M 
  
4 The equilibrium in the innovation stage 
Let ,0 , N = 1,… , , denote the own R&D expenditure made by firm N in the first stage. Because 
the profit made by a firm in the production stage is bounded above, it is not optimal for any firm 
to spend a large amount of its own resources on R&D. Thus, we shall assume that the own R&D 
made by each firm is constrained to belong to a closed bounded interval, say 0 ≤ ,0 ≤ O, N =1, … , , where O is a finite positive number. Given the list ),...,( 1 nxx  of own R&D expenditures, 
the profit – net of R&D costs – earned by firm i  over the two stages of the game is given by 
(12) P%,#, … , ,% , … , ,&	 = −,% + 3%##, … , %#, … , &#	 = 
            −,% + 3%Q − ,# + R∑ ,002# 	, … ,  − ,% + R∑ ,002% 	, … ,  − ,& + R∑ ,002& 	S.                                                                                                 
                            
The first-order condition that characterizes the best response of firm i  to ijjx ≠)(  is 
(13) TU.V=,…,V.,…,VW	TV. = −1 − TX.Q<==,…,<.=,…,<W=ST<.= Q,% + R∑ ,002% S 
                      −R∑ TX.Q<==,…,<.=,…,<W=ST<A= Q,0 + R∑ ,0020 S02% ≤ 0, 
with equality holding when ,% > 0.  
Note that it is not optimal for a firm to spend a positive amount of its own resources on R&D and 
then chooses not to produce a positive level of output in the production stage. Furthermore, a 
firm might find it profitable to produce a positive level of output even when it did not spend any 
of its own resources on R&D in the first stage. Under this scenario, it takes advantage of the 
spillovers from the R&D activities of all the firms which choose to spend a positive amount of 
their own resources on their R&D activities to lower its own marginal cost.  
When the own R&D expenditure of firm  is positive, the following second-order condition must 
also be satisfied: 
(14) TFU.V=,…,V.,…,VW	TV.F < 0. 
 
Let Z%,#, … , ,%#, ,%?#, … , ,&	 denote firm ′ best response – presumed to be unique – to ,#, … , ,%#, ,%?#, … , ,&,  = 1, … , . It is simple to show that the map Z%: ,#, … , ,%#, ,%?#, … , ,& → Z%,#, … , ,%#, ,%?#, … , ,&	  
is continuous. Thus, the map 
 
,#, … , ,%, … , ,& → Z%,#, … , ,% , … , ,&	%]#&  
is a continuous map from the convex compact subset 0, O	& of the n-dimensional Euclidean 
space into itself, and thus, according to the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, will have a fixed 
point. The fixed point, which we presume to be unique and denote by ,#, R	, … , ,&, R	, 
represents the equilibrium list of own R&D expenditures made by the  firms. Note that the 
argument just presented establishes the existence of an equilibrium for any number of firms. 
Furthermore, for an arbitrary number of firms in the market, some firms might make zero net 
profit (net of own R&D cost). In particular, when the number of firms is large, the equilibrium 
might involve some firms being not active in the production stage, which necessarily means that 
these firms do not expend any of their own resources on R&D, and thus can be dropped from the 
game without affecting the equilibrium generated by the remaining firms. In other words, these 
firms will choose not to enter the market. 
For an equilibrium under which each firm spends a positive amount of its own resources on 
R&D, (12) takes on the following more specific form: 
(15) P%,#, … , ,% , … , ,&	 
                         = −,% + #@&?#F ^ ( − / − Q,% + R∑ ,002% S1+∑ / − Q,0 + R/,% + ∑ ,002%,020 1S102% _
`.           
Furthermore, the first-order condition (13) becomes          
(16) TU.V=,…,V.,…,VW	TV. = −1 + `@&?#F ^ ( − / − Q,% + R∑ ,002% S1+∑ / − Q,0 + R/,% + ∑ ,002%,020 1S102% _ × 
                                                        
^ ′Q,% + R∑ ,002% S−R ∑ ′Q,0 + R/,% + ∑ ,002%,020 1S02% _ = 0,   = 1,… , , 
and the second-order condition (14) becomes 
(17) TFU.V=,…,V.,…,VW	TV.F = ^ ( − /
 − Q,% + R∑ ,002% S1+∑ / − Q,0 + R/,% + ∑ ,002%,020 1S102% _ × 
                                  
^ ′′Q,% + R∑ ,002% S−R`∑ ′′Q,0 + R/,% + ∑ ,002%,020 1S02% _ 
                                            +^ ′Q,% + R∑ ,002% S−R ∑ ′Q,0 + R/,% + ∑ ,002%,020 1S02% _
` < 0.     
  
Note that if each firm makes a positive own expenditure on R&D, i.e., if ,%, R	 > 0 for all  = 1, … , , then the  first-order conditions in (16) are symmetric, and it is necessary that all the 
own R&D expenditures are the same, i.e., ,#, R	 = ⋯ = ,&, R	 = ,, R	, where we have 
used ,, R	 to denote their common own R&D expenditure. In this case, the equilibrium is a 
symmetric equilibrium under which each firm spends a positive amount of its own resources on 
R&D, and we refer to such an equilibrium as a symmetric equilibrium with innovation. It might 
also happen that in equilibrium some firms incur a positive level of own R&D cost while some 
other firms choose not to do so. In this case, the equilibrium is an asymmetric equilibrium, with 
one proper subset of the firms incurring a positive level of own R&D cost while all the firms 
outside this subset choose not to do so. Because the first-order conditions in (16) that 
characterize the own R&D expenditures of the firms that choose to spend a positive amount of 
their own resources on R&D are symmetric, the own R&D expenditures of these firms must be 
the same. Finally, it might happen that in equilibrium none of the firms chooses to spend any of 
its own resources on R&D. In this case, the equilibrium is a symmetric equilibrium without 
innovation. 
For a symmetric equilibrium with innovation, the effective R&D expenditure of each firm is 
given by 
 #, R	 = ⋯ = &, R	 = , R	 = ,, R	1 +  − 1R,  
where , R	 denote the firms’ common effective expenditure. Furthermore, the first-order 
condition (16) is then reduced to 
(18) −1 + `&&#b@&?#F ( −  + , R		′Q, R	S = 0,  
and the second-order condition (17) is reduced to 
(19) &&#bF&&#b /( −  +  ],[ βn 	1Q ],[ βn S + / ],[ βn 	1` < 0. 
Because   
 
`&&#b@&?#F ( −  + , R		Q, R	S < 1 
when  is large, the first-order condition (18) will fail to hold and a fortiori no symmetric 
equilibrium with innovation will exist.  
For the case  = 1, the first-order condition (18) is reduced to 
(20) −1 + #`@ ( −  + 1, R		′Q1, R	S,
  
which is the first-order condition for maximizing (15). As for the second-order condition (19), it 
is reduced to 
(21) /( −  + Q1, R	S1Q1, R	S + /Q1, R	S1` < 0, 
which is the second-order condition for maximizing (15), namely the second-order condition for 
monopoly profit maximization. 
We note in passing that if the curve	 → ( −  + 		,  ≥ 0, is downward-sloping, a 
main assumption in the model of Kamien et al. (1992), then the solution of the first-order 
condition (18) is unique, and a symmetric equilibrium with innovation, if it exists, is necessarily 
unique. If more than one value of  satisfies the first-order condition (18), then the second-order 
condition (19) must be used to eliminate the inappropriate value of  that satisfies this first-order 
condition. Another possibility is that there might be a value of  that satisfies both the first order 
condition (18) and the second-order condition (19), but such a value of  leads to a negative net 
profit for each firm when we set ,# = ⋯ = ,& = #?&#b  in (15). Under such a scenario, there 
is no symmetric equilibrium under which  constitutes the effective R&D expenditure of each 
firm in the market.  
The product price under a symmetric equilibrium with innovation when there are  firms in the 
market is given by 
(22) , R	 = ;?&/<cd&,b	1&?# . 
The net profit made by a firm under a symmetric equilibrium with innovation, when there are  
firms in the market, is given by 
(23) − &,b	#?&#b + D;/<cd&,b	1E
F
@&?#F . 
 
An example: Suppose that the R&D production function is given by (2). For a symmetric 
equilibrium with innovation, the first-order condition (18) becomes 
(24) −1 + `&&#b@&?#F ( −  = 0.  
The slope of the curve 
(25) P:  → P	 = 	−1 + `&&#b@&?#F ( −  ,  ≥ 0, 
is 
(26) P	 = `&&#bF<c@&?#F `2 − (.  
Observe that if  ≤ ;`, then P	 < 0 is negative for all  > 0, and the curve P:  → P	 is 
downward-sloping. In this case, the solution of the first-order condition (18), if it exists, is 
unique. On the other hand, if  > ;`, then the curve P:  → P	 has the shape of an inverted U: 
rising at first, attaining its global maximum at  = # eHf g`<c; h, and then strictly declining to −∞ 
when  → 	∞. For the case  > ;`, if the curve P: → P	 does not cross the horizontal axis 
on its rising part, then a symmetric equilibrium with innovation does not exist. On the other 
hand, if the curve P: → P	 crosses the horizontal axis on its rising part, then on its declining 
part it crosses the horizontal axis again. In this case, there exist two values of  that satisfy the 
first-order condition (18). At the first crossing the expression on the left side of (19) is equal to  − 11 − RR > 0, and this means that the second-order condition (19) is not satisfied at 
the first crossing. Thus, a symmetric equilibrium with innovation, if it exists, must occur at the 
second crossing.   
If we let i = , then the first-order condition (24) becomes 
(27) −1 + `&&#b@&?#F ( − ii = 0,  
which is a quadratic equation in i. The two roots of (27) are of the same sign, and are given by 
(28) ji → ;k<clk`@#?&F?;Fk<cF`k<cF , i → ;k<c?lk`@#?&F?;Fk<cF`k<cF m, 
where we have let n = 1 − R + R. 
As can be seen from (28), the second root is positive. Hence the first root is also positive. If the 
second root is greater than 1, then it must be rejected because i =  < 1. On the other hand, 
if the second root is less than 1, then the first root is also less than 1. Furthermore, if the curve P:  → P	 crosses the horizontal axis twice, then the first-order condition (24) has two roots, 
and the larger root corresponds to the second crossing, and this means that the smaller root of 
(27) is the correct value of i for the effective R&D expenditure under the symmetric equilibrium 
with innovation. Thus, the effective R&D expenditure of a firm under a symmetric equilibrium 
with innovation is given by 
(29) , R	 = − # eHfQi, R	S, 
where we have let   
(30) i, R	 = #`<c ^( − ;F&#b?b`@#?&F&#b?b _ < 1.  
 5 Entry 
To fix ideas about the entry process, we shall assume that a firm will enter the market only if it 
can earn positive net profits. For any value of R, there are two possible scenarios to consider. 
Under the first scenario, there is a positive integer , such that (i) when there are  firms in the 
market, each firm earns positive net profit in equilibrium, and (ii) when there are more than are  firms in the market, at least one firm earns zero net profit in equilibrium. Because we assume 
that a firm only enters the market if it earn positive net profit, exactly  firms will enter the 
market under this scenario, and  then represents the equilibrium number of firms. Under the 
second scenario, for any positive integer , there exists a positive integer  ≥ , such that under 
the equilibrium with  firms in the market each firm earns positive net profit. In this case, the 
entry process goes on indefinitely, and in the limit, the equilibrium number of firms is infinite. In 
what follows, we shall denote by R	 the equilibrium number of firms. Under the first scenario, R	 < ∞, while under the second scenario, R	 = ∞.  
6 The properties of the equilibrium 
Proposition 1: Under any equilibrium, the number of firms that expend a positive amount of their 
own resources on R&D is finite. 
PROOF: The proof is by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium under 
which an infinite number of firms choose to expend a positive amount of their own resources on 
R&D. The competition among these firms will drive the product price down to their post-
innovation marginal cost, and each of them will earn zero profit in the production stage. The 
profit net of own R&D cost of each of these firms will then be negative, and this cannot occur in 
equilibrium.                  ■   
In what follows, we denote by ?R	 the number of firms in the market that choose to spend a 
positive amount of their own resources on R&D under the equilibrium with R as the degree of 
spillovers. Note that 0 ≤ ?R	 ≤ R	. Without any loss of generality, we can assume that the 
first ?R	 firms are exactly the firms that choose to expend a positive amount of their own 
resources on R&D and that the firms which choose not to expend any of their own resources on 
R&D are the last R	 − ?R	 firms.  
Also, for any R, let R	 denote the critical number of firms such that for any positive integer 
 ≤ R	, there exists a symmetric equilibrium with innovation when  firms enter the market, 
but no symmetric equilibrium with innovation when there are R	 + 1 firms in the market. It is 
clear that R	 ≤ R	. Note that when R	 = R	, the equilibrium is a symmetric equilibrium 
with innovation under which exactly R	 firms will enter the market.   
When the degree of spillovers is low, a firm cannot rely on the spillovers generated by the other 
firms to lower its own marginal cost. To obtain any desired reduction in marginal cost, a firm 
must bear most of the costs needed to run its own research lab, and this discourages entry. 
Furthermore, once a firm has entered the market, it must expend a substantial amount of its own 
resources to generate a given level of cost reduction. Hence when the degree of spillovers is low, 
we can expect a small number of firms to enter the market, and once a firm has entered the 
market, it will expend a positive amount of its own resource on R&D. These intuitive results are 
confirmed in Proposition 2.  
Proposition 2: When the degree of spillovers is low and the initial common marginal cost is close 
to the choke price, the number of firms that enter the market is R	, and the equilibrium is a 
symmetric equilibrium with innovation.  
PROOF: Under the symmetric equilibrium with innovation that prevails after R	 firms have 
entered the market, the product price, according to (20), is given by  
(31) QR	, RS = ;?&/<cd&b	,b	1&?# . 
Observe that QR	, RS will much lower than  if  is close to the choke price (. Now if the 
first R	 firms continue to use the strategies associated with the symmetric equilibrium with R	 firms, then firm R	 + 1, which does not spend any of its own resources on R&D, will not 
manage to lower its cost below QR	, RS because of the low degree of spillovers, and thus will 
not be able to produce any positive output in order to earn positive profits. Thus, no more entry 
will take place after R	 firms have entered the market.                    ■ 
The following lemma asserts that at some stage during the entry process, if an equilibrium under 
which none of the firms chooses to expend its own resource on R&D is reached, then the entry 
process will continue indefinitely, and in the limit the equilibrium is the competitive equilibrium 
without innovation. 
Lemma 1: For any value of R, if there exists a positive integer  such that under the equilibrium 
with R as the degree of spillovers and  as the number of firms in the market no firm chooses to 
expend its own resource on R&D, then the entry process continues indefinitely, and in the limit, 
the resulting equilibrium is the competitive equilibrium without innovation.  
PROOF: Suppose that  firms have already entered the market. Let us consider the problem faced 
by firm  + 1, which is contemplating entering the market. Let us imagine that the marginal cost 
of firm  + 1 in the production stage is equal to the product’s choke price. Under such a 
scenario, this firm will choose not to produce any positive level of output, and this means that the 
equilibrium in the production stage with firms 1,… , ,  + 1 in the market is identical with the 
equilibrium with  firms in the market. Now let us lower the marginal cost of firm  + 1 from 
the level of the product’s choke price to , the initial common marginal cost, while maintaining 
the marginal costs of firm 1 to firm  at . During the process, the profit in the production stage 
of each of the firms 1, … ,  will be falling.4  When the marginal cost of firm  + 1 descends to , each of the  + 1 firms will produce the same level of output at the same marginal cost , 
and earns the same level of profit in the production stage. Next, note that according to the 
hypothesis of the lemma, none of the firms finds it profitable to expend its own resource on R&D 
when the  − 1 remaining firms choose not to incur any R&D cost on their own. Hence when 
one more firm enters the market and  of them choose not to expend any of their own resources 
on R&D, the remaining firm, which faces more competition when there are  + 1 firms in the 
market than when there are  firms in the market, will not find it profitable, either, to expend its 
own resource on R&D. We have just demonstrated that under the equilibrium with  + 1 firms 
in the market none of the firms chooses to expend its own resource on R&D.  
                                                 
4
 It is well known in Cournot oligopoly theory with linear demand curve and constant marginal costs that a fall in the 
marginal cost of a firm improves its profitability, but reduces the profit made by each of the other firms. 
The argument just presented can be repeated ad infinitum to show that the entry process will 
continue indefinitely, and in the limit the equilibrium is the competitive equilibrium without 
innovation.                                       ■ 
Lemma 2: Suppose that for some R, there exists a positive integer  such that under the 
equilibrium with R as the degree of spillovers and with  as the number of firms in the market 
none of the firms chooses to expend any of its own resource on R&D. Then for any R, R < R ≤1, there exists a positive integer  ≤  such that under the equilibrium with R′ as the degree of 
spillovers and with ′ as the number of firms in the market none of the firms chooses to expend 
any of its own resource on R&D.  
PROOF: According to the hypotheses of Lemma 1, if R is the degree of spillovers then none of 
the  firms will expend a positive amount of its own resource on R&D when the remaining  − 1 firms choose not to spend any positive amount of their own resources on R&D. This 
statement is still true when the degree of spillovers is R > R, and when the number of firms in 
the market is still .                   ■ 
Lemma 3: If R is close to 1, then there exists a positive integer  such that under the equilibrium 
with R as the degree of spillovers and with  as the number of firms in the market none of the 
firms chooses to expend any of its own resource on R&D.  
PROOF: The proof of Lemma 3 requires some limiting arguments, and is given in Annex A. 
When there are full spillovers R = 1, the entire own R&D expenditure made by a firm flows 
freely to its rivals, and any rival firm – at no cost of its own – can obtain the same cost reduction 
obtained by the former firm. The full R&D spillovers destroy the incentive for any firm to spend 
its own resources on R&D. Indeed, if in equilibrium a firm chooses to incur a positive level of 
own R&D cost, then an infinite number of firms will enter the market and operate at the same 
marginal cost as the firm that spends a positive amount of its own resource on R&D. Under this 
scenario, there will be perfect competition in the post-innovation stage, with the ensuing 
consequence that all the firms in the market will earn zero profit (gross of own R&D cost) in the 
production stage. Thus, when there are full spillovers the equilibrium market structure is that of 
perfect competition without innovation. More generally, when the degree of spillovers is high, a 
firm that chooses to expend a positive amount of its own resource on R&D bears the entire 
burden of its own R&D cost, but most of the fruit of its R&D activities flow freely to its rivals, 
and this destroys the incentive for a firm to spend its own resource on R&D, as asserted by the 
following proposition.  
Proposition 3: If R is close to 1, then an infinite number of firms will enter the market, and a firm 
– once it has entered the market – will choose not to spend any of its own resources on R&D. 
That is, when the degree of spillovers is high, there will be no innovation, and the resulting 
equilibrium market structure is that of perfect competition without innovation.   
PROOF: To prove Proposition 3, invoke Lemma 3 and then Lemma 1.                ■ 
                                                       
Proposition 2 asserts the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with innovation when the degree 
of spillovers is low, while Proposition 3 asserts that perfect competition without innovation will 
prevail when the degree of spillovers is high. Proposition 4 asserts the existence of an 
asymmetric equilibrium – an equilibrium under which some firms choose to expend a positive 
amount of their own resources on R&D while other firms choose not to – when the degree of 
spillovers take on the intermediate values. Proposition 4 asserts that when the degree of 
spillovers is low, a firm that wishes to enter the market cannot rely on the spillovers to lower its 
own marginal cost and must bear most of the burden required to lower its own marginal cost. 
This factor reduces the incentive for entry, and the equilibrium is a symmetric equilibrium with 
innovation under which a small number of firms choose to enter the market. When the degree of 
spillovers has risen sufficiently, the spillovers allow more firms to enter the market, and some of 
the entrants can free ride on the R&D activities of other entrants: the equilibrium is then an 
asymmetric equilibrium. When the degree of spillovers reaches a high level, there is no incentive 
for any firm to expend its own resources on R&D, and the resulting equilibrium is the 
competitive equilibrium without innovation. 
Proposition 4: Suppose that pre-innovation common marginal cost is high. There exist two values 
of R, say Rand  R, with  0 < R < R < 1, which have the following properties: 
(i)  For all 0 < R < R, the equilibrium with R as the degree of spillovers is a symmetric 
equilibrium with innovation. 
(ii) For all R, R < R ≤ 1, the equilibrium with R as the degree of spillovers is the competitive 
equilibrium without innovation. 
(iii) There exists a value of R ∈ DR, RE, such that the equilibrium with R as the degree of 
spillovers is an asymmetric equilibrium.  
PROOF: The proof of Proposition 4 is technical and is given in Annex B.  
Lemma 4 deals with the effect of low degrees of spillovers on consumers’ surplus, producers’ 
surplus, and social welfare. In proving (iii) of Lemma 4, we assume that the R&D technology is 
given by (2).  
Lemma 4: When R rises in a small right neighborhood of 0, (i) consumers’ surplus fall (ii) 
producers’ surplus rises; and (iii) social welfare rises. 
 
PROOF: The proof of Lemma 4 involves the computations of various derivatives, and is quite 
technical. It is relegated to Annex C. 
The following proposition describes how the degree of spillovers affects social welfare. 
Proposition 5: Suppose that the functional form of the R&D production function is given by (2). 
As the degree of spillovers rises from 0 to 1, social welfare first rises with R, reaches a 
maximum, and then declines to the lowest possible level, which is the social welfare associated 
with the competitive equilibrium.   
PROOF: Proposition 5 follows immediately from Proposition 2, Proposition 3, and Lemma 4. ■ 
The economic contents of Proposition 5 embody the tension between allocative efficiency and 
dynamic efficiency. When the degree of spillovers is low, a firm can appropriate most of the fruit 
of its own R&D, and this encourages innovation. This incentive is reduced when the degree of 
spillovers rises, and each firm spends less of its own resources on R&D. On the other hand, the 
rise in the degree of spillovers encourages entries. Social welfare rises with the degree of 
spillovers when it rises slightly above zero because the allocative efficiency effect dominates the 
dynamic efficiency effect. After the degree of spillovers has reached a sufficiently high level, the 
spillovers discourage firms from spending their own resources on R&D, with the ensuing 
consequence that the equilibrium is the competitive equilibrium without innovation: the rise in 
allocative efficiency generated by the high number of firms scarcely counteracts the dramatic 
loss in dynamic efficiency. For intermediate values for the degree of spillovers, the initial rise in 
social welfare is reversed when the gain in allocative efficiency cannot offset the loss in dynamic 
efficiency.  
  
7 A numerical simulation 
In the numerical simulation, the R&D technology is assumed to have the functional form 
represented by (2).To compute the equilibrium number of firms for the two-stage game, we 
proceed as follows. We begin with the monopoly case, and then successively raise the number of 
firms by 1 each time. At each step, use (29) to compute the effective R&D expenditure of the 
symmetric equilibrium with innovation for the current number of firms. If the symmetric 
equilibrium with innovation when there are  firms cannot deter entry, then raise the number of 
firms to  + 1, and then try to compute the symmetric equilibrium with innovation when  + 1 
firms are in the market. If there is no symmetric equilibrium with innovation for the case of  + 1 firms – either because there is no positive value of  that satisfies the first-order condition 
(24) or because there exists a positive value of  that satisfies the first-order condition (24), but 
using it will result in a negative profit net of R&D cost for each of the  + 1 firms – then the 
equilibrium must be an asymmetric equilibrium under which some firms choose to incur a 
positive level of own R&D cost, while others choose not to do so.  
At any step of the procedure just described, entry will occur if it is profitable for new firms to 
enter the market. The first time it is not profitable for a new firm to enter the market, we have 
found the equilibrium number of firms. The following table summarizes the results of the 
simulations5 we carried out for various values of R. 
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 The results of the simulation are obtained with the help of a large number of Mathematica programs. 
Table 1. 
The equilibria for various values of o (Parameter values: p = q, r = s. tu, vs = t. wu, x = t. wu) 
 
 R	 ?R	 ,?R	 %#,  ≤ ?R	 %#,  > ?[R] [R] yz[R] {z[R] z|[R] 
R = 0 4 4 1.21 0.10 NA 0.68 0.54 10.78 11.32 
R = 0.1 5 5 0.81 0.12 NA 0.60 0.57 11.49 12.06 
R = 0.2 88 6 0.45 0.24 0.63 0.63 1.06 11.22 12.28 
R = 0.3 ∞ 6 0.30 0.35 0.63 0.63 0.02 11.25 11.27 
R = 0.4 ∞ 4 0.30 0.46 0.74 0.74 0.14 10.19 10.33 
R = 0.5 ∞ 3 0.28 0.60 0.88 0.88 0.10 8.96 9.06 
R = 0.6 ∞ 2 0.27 0.83 1.12 1.12 0.13 7.09 7.22 
R = 0.7 ∞ 1 0.29 1.23 1.57 1.57 0.16 4.09 4.25 
R = 0.8 ∞ 0 NA NA NA 2.75 0 0.125 0.125 
R = 0.9 ∞ 0 NA NA NA 2.75 0 0.125 0.125 
R = 1 ∞ 0 NA NA NA 2.75 0 0.125 0.125 
 
The first row of the table gives the equilibrium for the case of no spillovers R = 0. Under this 
equilibrium, 4 firms enter the market [R] = 4, and each of them ?[R] = 4 chooses to 
spend a positive amount ,?[R] = 1.21 of its own resource on R&D. The equilibrium is thus a 
symmetric equilibrium with innovation. The post-innovation marginal cost is %# = 0.10,  =
1, … , [R]. The equilibrium product price is [R] = 0.68. As for welfare, the producers’ surplus 
(net of R&D cost) is yz[R] = 0.54 and the consumer surplus is {z[R] = 10.78, which sum up to 
a level of social welfare given by z|[R] = 11.32. 
The second line of the table gives the equilibrium for the case R = 0.1. The equilibrium is a 
symmetric equilibrium with innovation under which 5 firms enter the market. The amount of 
own resource that a firm spends on R&D is 0.81, which yields an effective R&D of 0.811 +5 − 10.1 = 0.811.4 = 1.134, which is less than 1.21, the effective R&D expenditure of 
each firm under the symmetric equilibrium with innovation for R = 0. The post-innovation cost 
is %# = 0.12,  = 1,… , R	. The equilibrium product price is 0.60, which is lower than the value 
it takes under the symmetric equilibrium with innovation for the case of no spillovers. The lower 
product price implies a higher level of consumers’ surplus. The producers’ surplus is also higher. 
The end result is a higher level of social welfare. The spillovers make it possible for one more 
firm to enter the market. Although the post-innovation marginal cost is higher than when there 
are no spillovers, the gain in welfare due to a higher number of firms more than offset the impact 
of the higher post-innovation marginal cost relatively to the case of no spillovers. 
The third line gives the equilibrium for the case R = 0.2. The equilibrium number of firms is 
now 88, with 6 firms choosing to spend a positive amount of their own resources ,?R	 =0.45 on R&D, while the remaining firms choose not to incur any own R&D cost. The 
equilibrium is asymmetric.  The post-innovation marginal cost for the firms that spend a positive 
amount of their own resources on R&D is %# = 0.24,  = 1,… , ?R	. The post-innovation 
marginal cost for those who free ride on the R&D activities of other firms is %# = 0.63,  =?R	 + 1,… , R	. The equilibrium product price is 0.63, which is slightly higher than that 
under the equilibrium for the case R = 0.1, and this implies a slightly lower level of consumers’ 
surplus 11.22 < 11.49. The much lower own R&D cost of each firm helps to raise the 
producers’ surplus substantially 1.06 > 0.57. Social welfare is higher 12.28 > 12.06 than 
the level attained for the case R = 0.1.   
The fourth line gives the equilibrium for the case R = 0.3. The equilibrium number of firms is 
now infinite, with 6 firms choosing to spend a positive amount of their own resources ,?R	 =0.30 on R&D, while the remaining firms choose not to incur any own R&D cost. The 
equilibrium is asymmetric.  The post-innovation marginal cost for the firms that spend a positive 
amount of their own resources on R&D is %# = 0.35,  = 1,… , ?R	. The post-innovation 
marginal cost for those who free ride on the R&D activities of other firms is %# = 0.63,  =
?R	 + 1,… , R	. The equilibrium product price is 0.63. The producers’ surplus is 0.02 and 
the consumers’ surplus is 11.25, which sum up to a social welfare level of 11.27. Note that 
social welfare has dropped when  R rises from 0.2 to 0.3. The fall in social welfare is due to the 
lower own R&D expenditures made by the firms that choose to do so and the competition from 
the fringe made possible by the higher degree of spillovers.   
The fifth line gives the equilibrium for the case R = 0.4. The equilibrium number of firms is 
infinite, with 4 firms choosing to spend a positive amount of their own resources ,?R	 =0.30 on R&D, while the remaining firms choose not to incur any own R&D cost. The 
equilibrium is asymmetric.  The post-innovation marginal cost for the firms that spend a positive 
amount of their own resources on R&D is %# = 0.46,  = 1,… , ?R	. The post-innovation 
marginal cost for those who free ride on the R&D activities of other firms is %# = 0.74,  ≥	?R	 + 1. The equilibrium product price is 0.74. The producers’ surplus is 0.14 and the 
consumers’ surplus is 10.19, which sum up to a social welfare level of 10.33. Note that the 
producers’ surplus rises when R rises from 0.3 to 0.4 because of the lower number of firms that 
incur a positive level of own R&D cost. Also, note that social welfare has dropped when  R rises 
from 0.3 to 0.4. The fall in social welfare is due to the lower own R&D expenditures made by 
the firms that choose to do so and the competition from the fringe made possible by the higher 
degree of spillovers.   
The sixth line gives the equilibrium for the case R = 0.5. An infinite number of firms enter the 
market, and among them 3 firms choose to spend a positive amount of their own resources on 
R&D. The post-innovation marginal cost of the 3 dominant firms is 0.60, while the post-
innovation marginal cost of the firms of the fringe is 0.88. Relatively to the case R = 0.5, the 
producers’ surplus (0.10) is higher; the consumers’ surplus is lower; and social welfare is lower.  
The seventh line gives the equilibrium for the case R = 0.6. An infinite number of firms enter 
the market, and among them 2 firms choose to spend a positive amount of their own resources on 
R&D. The post-innovation marginal cost of the 2 dominant firms is 0.83, while the post-
innovation marginal cost of the firms of the fringe is 1.12. Relatively to the case R = 0.6, the 
producers’ surplus (0.13) is higher; the consumers’ surplus is lower; and social welfare (7.22) is 
lower.  
The eighth line gives the equilibrium for the case R = 0.7. An infinite number of firms enter the 
market, and among them only one firm chooses to spend a positive amount of their own 
resources on R&D. The post-innovation marginal cost of the dominant firm is 1.23, while the 
post-innovation marginal cost of the firms of the fringe is 1.57. Relatively to the case R = 0.7, 
the producers’ surplus (0.13) is higher; the consumers’ surplus is lower; and social welfare (4.25) 
is lower.  
The last three lines of the table give the equilibria for the cases R = 0.8, 0.9, and 1.0, 
respectively. An infinite number of firms enter the market, and the resulting equilibrium market 
structure is perfect competition without innovation. Under perfect competition, the market price 
is equal to the initial common marginal cost; the producers’ surplus is 0; and the consumers’ 
surplus is 0.125. Thus, high values for the degree of spillovers yield the lowest level of social 
welfare possible. 
The numerical simulation indicates that social welfare is at its highest level at R = 0.2. The 
market structure is that of an asymmetric equilibrium under which some firms expend a positive 
amount  of their own resources on R&D while many firms free ride on the R&D activities of 
others to lower their own marginal cost. 
 
8 Conclusion 
In this essay we have formulated a model of the AJ type to analyze the impact of R&D spillovers 
on entry and the resulting equilibrium market structure. We find that the degree of spillovers 
plays a fundamental role on the number of firms entering the market, their R&D activities, and 
social welfare. Our analysis suggests that social welfare is maximized at some intermediate 
degree of spillovers. The policy implication of this result is that neither complete protection of 
intellectual property right nor lax enforcement of patent laws is socially optimal. Uncertainty and 
risk are important factors in R&D, but they have been ignored in the literature. These factors 
merit more attention. A more complete modeling of the innovation process should include an 
examination of the major drivers influencing the degree of spillovers: distance between the 
innovators, property rights, and the extent of telecommunication networks.  
Annex A: The Proof of Lemma 3 
We prove Lemma 3 by reductio ad absurdum. If Lemma 3 is not true, then we can find a 
sequence R ,  = 0,1, …, with R < 1, R ↑ 1, such that for any  and any positive integer , at 
least one firm will expend a positive amount of its own resource on R&D under the equilibrium 
with R as the degree of spillovers and  as the number of firms in the market. If the equilibrium 
number of firm when R is the degree of spillovers is finite, then a possible value for  is  = R	. When R	 = ∞,  a possible value for  is a positive integer  that satisfies the 
condition  > ##b.	  
According to (16), the following first-order condition characterizes the own R&D expenditure of 
a firm, say firm , which expends a positive amount of its own resource on R&D under the 
equilibrium with R as the degree of spillovers and  as the number of firms in the market:  
 (A.1) −1 + `@?#F ^ ( − / − Q,% + R ∑ ,002% S1+∑ / − Q,0 + R/,% + ∑ ,002%,020 1S102% _ × 
                                                        
^ ′Q,% + R ∑ ,002% S−R ∑ ′Q,0 + R/,% + ∑ ,002%,020 1S02% _ = 0.   
 
Now because R ↑ 1 when  → ∞, all of the firms, regardless of whether they choose to expend 
their own resources on R&D or choose to free ride on the R&D activities of others, will have the 
same post-innovation marginal cost in the limit. Hence the equilibrium number of firms, namely R	 will be indefinitely large when  → ∞, and this implies ℓ→ = ∞. Furthermore, 
the total industry R&D expenditure must tend to 0 when  → ∞. Indeed, if this is not the case, 
then the producers’ surplus – the total industry profits in the production stage minus the total 
industry R&D expenditure – will be negative, and this cannot hold in equilibrium. Thus, in the 
limit, the first-order condition (A.1) becomes 
(A.2) −1 + Dℓ→ `@	?#FE ( − 0	 = −1 < 0, 
which is not consistent with (A.1) in the limit.                    ■ 
Annex B: The Proof of Proposition 4 
Let R	be the least upper bound of the degrees of spillovers R, such that for all 0 < R < R, the 
equilibrium associated with R′ is a symmetric equilibrium with innovation. The existence of R	 
follows directly from Proposition 2. Using Proposition 3, we can assert the existence of a value, 
say R < 1, for the degree of spillovers, such that for all R < R ≤ 1, the equilibrium that prevails 
is perfect competition without innovation. To prove Proposition 4, we first establish a series of 
claims. 
Claim 1: We have R < R. 
PROOF: First, we claim that it is not possible to have R < R. Indeed, if this were the case, then 
for each value of R ∈ DR < RE, the equilibrium associated with R is both a symmetric 
equilibrium with innovation under which each firm earns net positive profit and the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium without innovation, and this is absurd. Thus, R ≤ R.    ■ 
                                                        
Claim 2: R ≠ R.  
PROOF: The claim is proved by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that R = R. Using the definition 
of R, we can find a symmetric equilibrium with innovation when the degree of spillovers is R − # 
for large positive integers . Such an equilibrium will converge to the equilibrium with R as the 
degree of spillovers when  → ∞. Furthermore, because the first-order condition (18) must be 
satisfied by each of these equilibria, in the limit, the equilibrium number of firms under the 
equilibrium with R as the degree of spillovers must be finite, i.e., R	 < ∞.  
Using the definition of R, we can find a sequence of degrees of spillovers R]# , with R ↓ R, 
such that for each  = 1,2, …, the equilibrium with R as the degree of spillovers is a competitive 
equilibrium without innovation. In the limit when  → ∞, these equilibria converge to a 
competitive equilibrium without innovation. Thus, the equilibrium number of firms when R is 
the degree of spillovers is QRS = ∞. Thus, if  R = R, then the equilibrium number of firms when 
the degree of spillovers is  R will be both finite and infinite, and this is absurd.             ■  
Claim 3: For some  > 0 sufficiently small, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium with 
R ∈ DR, R + E. 
PROOF: First, note that there is no perfectly competitive equilibrium without innovation for each 
possible value for the degree of spillovers R ∈ DR, R + E.  Indeed, if this is not true, then we can 
find a sequence of degrees of spillovers decreasing to R, such that the equilibrium associated 
with each of these degrees of spillovers is a competitive equilibrium without innovation, and this 
cannot be true by the argument used to establish Claim 2. Next, note that if there is no 
asymmetric equilibrium associated with some R ∈ DR, R + E, then the equilibria associated with 
all R ∈ DR, R + E must be symmetric equilibria with innovation, and this contradicts the fact 
that R is the least upper bound of the values of R such that for all R′ < R, the equilibrium with R′ 
as the degree of spillovers is a symmetric equilibrium with innovation. 
Together, the three claims constitute Proposition 4.                              ■ 
 
Annex C: The Proof of Lemma 4 
To prove (i) of Lemma 4, first note that the consumers’ surplus under a symmetric equilibrium 
with innovation is given by 
(C.1) {z, R	 = #` ( − , R	8, R	,  
where, according to (9), 
(C.2) R	, R	 = ;?&/<cd&b	,b	1&?#  
is the equilibrium product price, and  
(C.3) 8R	, R	 = &;&/<cd&b	,b		1&b	?#@ , 
according to (8), is the equilibrium industry output. 
Now the equilibrium number of firms when there are no spillovers is 0	. As R rises slightly 
from 0, the equilibrium number of firms remains at the same level, i.e., R	 = 0	 when R is 
small. Next, note that for R	 = 0	, the first-order condition (18) shifts downward as R rises 
slightly from 0.  Hence the equilibrium effective expenditure under the symmetric equilibrium 
with innovation falls – and this means that the equilibrium product price (C.2) rises – when R 
rises slightly from 0. The rise in the equilibrium product price implies a fall in the consumers’ 
surplus, and (i) of Lemma 4 is proved. 
To prove (ii) of Lemma 4, first, note that the producers’ surplus under a symmetric equilibrium 
with innovation is given by 
 yzR	, R	 = − &b	&b	,b	#?&b	#b + &b	@&b	?#F ( −  + R	, R		`,  
which assumes the following form when the degree of spillovers is low: 
(C.4) yz0	, R	 = − &	&	,b	#?&	#b + &	@&	?#F ( −  + 0	, R		`.  
Differentiating (C.4) with respect to R, we obtain 
(C.5) #&	 T&	,b	Tb = − ##?&	#b T&	,b	Tb + &	#&	,b	#?&	#bF + 
    + `/;<c?d&	,b		1d&	,b		@&	?#F T&	,b	Tb .   
Multiply (C.5) with 0	 − 0	 − 1R, we obtain 
(C.6) &	&	#b&	 T&	,b	Tb = − &	&	#b#?&	#b T&	,b	Tb + &	&	#b&	#&	,b	#?&	#bF + 
    + `&	&	#b/;<c?dQ&	,b	S1dQ&	,b	S@&?#F T&	,b	Tb  
   = − &	&	#b#?&	#b T&	,b	Tb + &	&	#b&	#&,b	#?&	#bF +
																																														T&	,b	Tb .  
Note that the third line in (C.6) has been obtained by using the first-order condition (18), which 
asserts that 
 
`&	&	#b/;<c?dQ&	,b	S1dQ&	,b	S@&	?#F = 1. 
Thus, 
(C.7) &	&	#b&	 T&	,b	Tb = D1 − &	&	#b#?&	#b E T&	,b	Tb  
                                                       + &	&	#b&	#&	,b	#?&	#bF  
When R → 0, (C.7) becomes 
(C.8) T&	,	Tb = 1 − 0	 T&	,	Tb + 0	0	 − 10	,0	 > 0.  
Note that the strict inequality (C.8) follows from the result T&,b	Tb < 0 and the fact that  > 1. 
That is,  T&b	,b	Tb > 0 when R is small. Hence the producer surplus rises with R when R is 
small, and (ii) of Lemma 4 is proved. 
To prove (iii) of Lemma 4, first, note that social welfare is given by  
(C.9) z|, R	 = {z, R	 + yz, R	. 
For low degrees of spillovers, we have6 
(C.10) T&	,	&	#Tb =    
																																			&	`D;l&	?l`@#?&	F?;F&	E&	Fl`@#?&	F?;F&		&	,	&	l`@#?&	F?;F&	 . 
                                                 
6
 The symbolic calculations were carried out by Mathematica. 
Because R	 ≥ 2, and because i, R	, as given by (30), is less than 1, the right side of (C.10) is 
positive. Hence as R rises in a right neighbourhood of 0, social welfare also rises with R, and (iii) 
of Lemma 4 is proved.                                                    ■ 
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